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Renegotiating the Realm of
Influence:
The Shifting Priorities of
President Trump during
NAFTA Renegotiations
SANFORD JONES

T

he politics of the President of the United
States, Donald Trump, has oscillated between the outward expression of promoting
United States (US) economic prosperity and
an antagonistic populism that seeks to isolate him and
his followers from established political norms. This has
recently manifested in the interrelations between domestic influence and foreign policy. Acting upon a campaign
promise to enter into a renegotiation with Canada and
Mexico of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), driven by a perception that this could
improve economic outcomes for the US, the Trump
Administration began to establish strategic objectives to
bring to the negotiating table. While the priorities stated
by the Administration displayed a moderate and sound
strategy in line with contemporary economists, a shift in
policy preference occurred once the renegotiation of the
agreement began. The Trump negotiating team moved
toward a decidedly more nationalist posture.
This article examines the factors that caused
that drastic shift in international trade policy. First,
it addresses the corporate interests that established
significant influence on the White House. Second, it
assesses the moderating influence on trade policy that
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followed from this corporate access. Third, it analyzes
the rationale behind the imbedded corporate interests
in trade policy and the importance of NAFTA to
influential American businesses. A contextual analysis
follows concerning the President’s comments about
the 2017 Charlottesville, Virginia protests and how
they affected corporate influence in the White House.
Next, this essay examines the effects of the dissolution
of access first granted to corporate interests, followed
by an analysis of populist nationalism and its impact
on the Administration’s trade negotiations. Finally, the
implications of these findings on US foreign policy and
international relations is considered.
Upon entering the Oval Office, President
Trump established economic advisory councils replete
with private-sector expertise. One such council, the
Strategic and Policy Forum, contained a multitude of
CEOs with the objective of advising the President “on
how government policy impacts economic growth,
job creation, and productivity” (Blackstone 2016).
Similarly, the President instituted a Manufacturing
Jobs Initiative, which sought input from CEOs on
government policy and regulations with the objective to
“promote job growth and get Americans back to work
again” (White House 2017b). Upon being appointed
chairman of the manufacturing council, Dow Chemical
CEO Andrew Liveris was optimistic that the Trump
Administration was “not going to do anything to harm
competitiveness” (quoted in Meyersohn 2017). While
ostensibly the councils were established to ensure that
economic policy aligned with the interests of American
businesses, their ability to increase job growth and
competitiveness hinged on access to the White House.
During preparations for the renegotiation of NAFTA,
the influence of business interests within the councils
seemed to deliver a moderating effect on the policy of
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the Trump Administration, which began by seeking
trade reforms consistent with internationalist economic
perspectives.
Before the Trump Administration began the
process of renegotiations with Canadian and Mexican
officials, it developed strategic approaches and objectives
for the international meetings. As NAFTA had not
been updated in the more than two decades, its
provisions were in need of adjustment, according to
many economists and scholars.1 The original negotiating
points set out by the Trump Administration seemed
to reflect this. There was a reluctance to simply reject
the agreement, as had been done with the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) (Irwin 2017, 45). In his report
to Congress, Robert Lighthizer (2017), the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) for the NAFTA
renegotiations, outlined a modernization strategy to
address digital trade, intellectual property, labor, and
environmental standards. These renegotiation policy
objectives were not a significant departure from those
that economic commentators had articulated over the
course of the agreement’s implementation; indeed,
the approach taken was notably similar to provisions
within the proposed TPP (Palmer, Behsudi, and Cassella
2017). This suggests that the business interests invited
to advise the White House on economic policy initially
established a significant influence on international trade
issues (Neal and Pascrell 2017). The congruence between
the initial renegotiation provisions, concerns of previous
US administrations and various expert opinions suggests

For recommended reforms to NAFTA see, for example, Hufbauer
and Schott (2005), Leblond and Fabian (2017), Schoen (1999), or
Smillie (2017).
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that Trump’s populist campaign rhetoric was initially
influenced by corporate interests. These interests were
afforded access to decision-makers through the Strategic
and Policy Forum and Manufacturing Jobs Initiative
advisory councils, which gave them an ability to impact
policy formulation.
The two advisory councils consisted primarily
of CEOs from the most profitable and influential
corporations in the US, and while their interests
differed on many policy issues, a significant number
of their members benefit from and support the notion
of a North American free-trade zone.2 Members
of the Strategic and Policy Forum involved with
manufacturing, such as General Motors (GM) and
General Electric (GE), have a preference for freetrade policies, especially within the North American
market. With a former CEO on the Strategic and Policy
Forum and the current CEO on the Manufacturing
Jobs Initiative council, GE has been a supportive
voice for NAFTA renegotiations as a modernization
attempt (Graham 2017). The position held by GE was
likely influential; its public positions on NAFTA were
consistent with the renegotiation objectives presented
in Lighthizer’s letter to Congress, which highlighted
the need for reforms in digital trade and intellectual

Among the members of the economic advisory councils are
financial and manufacturing firms that are involved in transnational
production in North America and have made statements in support
of NAFTA; others which neither benefit nor are disadvantaged
by international trade have mostly remained silent on the issue.
The major exception is labor. The AFL-CIO and the Alliance for
American Manufacturing, both represented on the Manufacturing
Jobs Initiative, have voiced concerns about lower wages and working
standards in Mexico and insufficient rules of origin to promote US
manufacturing, respectively (Trumka 2017; Paul 2017).
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property (General Electric Company 2017; Lighthizer
2017). Similarly, GM CEO and Strategic and Policy
Forum member Mary Barra was critical of intentions
to impose tariffs on continental trade (Gardner 2017).
Several investment and consulting firms involved in the
councils had produced reports noting the disruption
an abandonment of NAFTA would cause, while also
inferring the need to modernize the agreement (EY
2017; Wien 2017; Boston Consulting Group 2017).
During interviews in April of 2017, CEOs on the
Strategic and Policy Forum reported that the President
was actively listening to the councils and taking industry
advice into consideration when formulating policy
(Kelly 2017b). The diminished rhetoric threatening to
nullify NAFTA can be attributed to these corporate
interests (Kelly 2017a). However, as Hopkins (2007)
points out, the US experienced increasing stress between
the discourse of nationalist conservatism and assertive
corporate globalism, with an economy that has expanded
globally and a politics that remains decidedly local. The
“fear of foreign invaders, stirred up in the aftermath
of 9/11, called for the rebuilding of fortress America”
(Hopkins 2007, 109). This is the conflict within the
Trump strategy: at one end an economic need of global
integration and, at another, the local fear of losing a
moral and cultural identity.
Despite their initial influence in shaping
renegotiation objectives, the access afforded to members
of the advisory councils was eventually eliminated. The
decision to disband the councils was precipitated by
a majority of the councils’ members deciding to step
down after inflammatory remarks were made by the
President about the Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’
protest, in which Trump “appeared to confer legitimacy
on white supremacists” (Olorunnipa, McCormick,
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and Niquette 2017).3 As the NAFTA negotiations
began just days after these events, an increasing shift
was apparent within the Administration, and it began
to talk about ending the agreement between the US,
Canada and Mexico.4 Lighthizer’s opening remarks at
the first round of negotiations in Washington indicated
that the more moderate tone in strategic objectives
had been abandoned: “[w]e believe that Nafta [sic] has
fundamentally failed many Americans and needs major
improvements” (quoted in Mauldin and Vieira 2017).
The increase in protectionist nationalism within the
White House created a chaotic point of uncertainty.
Trump repeatedly threatened to initiate the NAFTA
withdrawal mechanism through an executive order.
The Trump Administration moved farther from the
goal of modernizing the agreement, favored by the
business interests of the advisory councils, toward
populist propositions that were clearly unacceptable
to others at the negotiating table (Swanson 2017a).
This was especially evident in the novel suggestion by
Lighthizer that the renewed agreement should include a
US-specific content provision for manufactured goods

It is unclear whether opposition to the President’s remarks about
the Charlottesville protests, and the resignations that followed,
represent a moral issue or merely a cost-benefit analysis among
businesses anxious to distance themselves from the White House.

3

Whether the disbandment of the advisory councils was by order
from the President or by way of a consensus within the council is an
issue unrelated to the one discussed here; the distinction between
the two possibilities does not address the rationale behind the
action (Tracer, Williams, and Son 2017). To contend that Trump
had orchestrated the councils’ dissolution would be to confirm
a continuation of his populist rhetoric, while alleging that the
councils disbanded on their own accord would imply that the extent
of the damage caused by the President’s previous populist rhetoric
was enough to dissuade collaboration with more moderate business
interests.
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rather than the current one that applied to regional
content in general (Donnan, Nicolaou, and Webber
2017). Not only was this new negotiating position
a misrepresentation of the stated goals within the
Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation
(USTR 2017), it rejected the once-influential advisory
councils’ view that such a qualification “would greatly
complicate the ability of companies, particularly smalland medium-size enterprises, to take advantage of the
benefits of Nafta [sic]” (Matt Blunt quoted in Wall Street
Journal 2017). Now following nationalist objectives, the
President increased threats to withdraw if demands were
not agreed to by Canadian and Mexican counterparts
(Swanson 2017b).
In the face of an increasingly nationalistic policy
standpoint, the moderating influence of the advisory
councils was eliminated and the White House returned
to the principles on which Trump began his electoral
campaign. For him, trade was decidedly a zero-sum game
and disagreement among partners was cause enough
for an abandonment of alliances.5 This shift away from
the influence of business interests resonated in other
spheres. For example, Trump arrested plans to establish
economic councils on infrastructure (Beech and Burns
2017). The new protectionist approach focused only
on US production and reflected the limited effects of
business influence after the disbanding of the councils.
This seems to support a theory of opportunity in policy-

The implications of a NAFTA abandonment have been the subject
of increasing study and have been an area of analysis by various
firms and scholars. Influential reports include Cheney et al. (2017),
Gertz (2017), Globerman and Sands (2017), Johnson (2017),
Mosquet, Handschuh, and Wilson (2017), Murphy (2017), Parilla
and Muro (2017), and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2017).
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making and influence: corporate influences could have
an impact on American foreign policy only insofar
as they have immediate access to the White House.
Business influence can be more strongly expressed when
institutions exist to support its advisory capacity. This
fits within Dahl’s (1998) plurality framework, which
sees these interests as part of a plurality that influences
policy through government access structures. When
these avenues of access break down, pluralism also
dwindles. While historically influential on government
policy, business interests have recently become limited
in their access to the Executive after the disbanding of
the advisory councils and thus have suffered diminishing
input in foreign economic policy (Pastor 1980, 45). This
diminished capacity to influence on the part of corporate
interest groups has resulted in a more radical nationalist
position taken by the Trump Administration toward the
renegotiation of the trade agreement.
This shift constitutes an exceptional circumstance
in American politics and the President’s populist
foundation for these actions is clear. The creation of
the Strategic and Policy Forum and the Manufacturing
Jobs Initiative was an ideological expression of freemarket liberalism, one generally embraced by the
Republican Party. But their destruction was the product
of radical populist nationalism. The electoral campaign
and subsequent presidency of Donald Trump took its
direction from a tradition of “Americans who have a
natural tendency… to take up positions of fear, hostility,
militancy, intransigence, and self-righteousness: in other
words nationalist positions” (Lieven 2012, 83). The
removal of business influence after Trump’s apparent
sympathizing with white supremacists exacerbated the
populist rhetoric of the White House, which now has
few moderating influences on its policy development.
The belligerent isolationism taken up by the
31 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018

Administration’s NAFTA negotiating team, which has
employed a strategy of repeatedly threatening to end the
Agreement, is the expression of a nationalist populism
free from the influence of economic elites.6 The formal
power structures within the Executive once contained a
regulated agonism between populist nationalism and the
interests of corporate elites; what Mouffe (2000) would
call the democratic paradox. But Trump’s demonization
of Washington elites has nullified that possibility.
Trump’s rise to power deployed the distinction between
an ‘us’ and ‘them’ struggling for hegemonic control; in
this case, a ‘people’s’ antagonism fighting for control
against a liberal globalist conspiracy. The nature of his
rise to power, therefore, made the continued existence
of an institutional agonism impossible (Žižek 2009,
277-81). The rhetoric the President employed, the
disbanding of the advisory councils, and the resulting
shift in renegotiation strategy have each been in line
with the populist hegemonic struggle for which Trump
was elected. A white, middle-class, nativist fear of
cultural loss, dispossession, or alien occupation has led
to the conspiratorial idea of a liberal dictatorship and
a hatred for its embodiment in economic elites as well
as ethnic and religious minorities (Lieven 2012, 85).
While the abandonment of the advisory councils may
have been a sign of return to original principles for some
of Trump’s radical nationalist supporters, it has severely
damaged the capacity of the NAFTA renegotiations
to obtain originally stated objectives, or real economic

Mearsheirmer and Walt (2007) exemplify this inequality of
influence in the case study The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.
Moreover, Lindblom (1977) demonstrates the effect of wealth on
the degree of interest group influence on democratic government in
politics and markets.
6
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advancement in the United States.
Abandoning NAFTA would be incredibly
damaging to the US economy, though analysts differ
as to the immediacy of the impact and the degree
to which corporations in various sectors would be
affected by this scenario. It is clear, however, that the
foreign policy strategy of the Trump Administration,
left unmoderated by critical influences, is harmful
for American national interests internationally. The
official policy of the Administration is demonstrably
lacking in substance on key international issues, with no
mention of alliances or global challenges save its aim to
destroy “ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups”
(White House 2017a). Within the Trump policy frame,
economic logic is abandoned for nationalist rhetoric.
Although the withdrawal from NAFTA is explicitly
offered as a solution within the America First Foreign
Policy (White House 2017a), it is seen in the frame of
benefitting manufacturers and American jobs which are
predominantly the beneficiaries of NAFTA and would
be likely much worse off within a nationalist economic
policy (Irwin 2017). The America First Foreign Policy
strategy in general, and the NAFTA renegotiations
in particular, have been negligent on the realities of
American interests and have simplified economic
problems to the point of illogical conclusions. Rather
than isolation from the international economy, job
growth in the US depends on stimulated domestic
demand and improving competitiveness in business.
While redressing ongoing trade disputes should be a
US foreign-policy objective, sacrificing international
relations with key allies by using belligerent rhetoric
and policy positions does nothing to improve economic
conditions and instead exemplifies a contempt for
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the American liberal-democratic principles that have
historically increased economic prosperity (Leffler 2017).
US foreign policy has traditionally accepted
a balanced approach to decision-making with an
acknowledged role in it for economic interests. This
has been undermined severely during the presidency
of Donald Trump. While it is clear that corporate
interests can exert significant influence on White
House policy, pluralism within the Executive can exist
only insofar as competing interests are given access to
decision-makers. The logic of this influence rests in the
benefits of democratic agonism within policymaking.
Given the Trump Administration’s goals of economic
advancement, these corporate interests represented a
source of business expertise, stakeholder consultation,
and moderation within the White House policymaking
mechanism. However, the populist antagonism displayed
by President Trump has eliminated the possibility of
moderation and endangered the renegotiation of the
trade agreement. In the absence of corporate influence
on the negotiations, a belligerent nationalist strategy has
developed in the US Administration that has exacerbated
the inherent difficulties of renegotiating NAFTA. The
policy shift made by the Trump Administration is
damaging not only to international relations but also
to national economic growth. There appears to be a
significant sacrifice of national interest for populist tenets
and it remains to be seen what further repercussions
this populist shift will have on both domestic and
international policy formation.
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